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I. Introduction 
 
In a much talked about paper, Camerer, Babcock, Lowenstein and Thaler 
(1997), (hereafter CBLT) outline some potentially cautionary news about the 
intertemporal labour supply hypothesis. The basis of their paper is that cab drivers will 
face day to day variation in their wage rates due to a variety of factors (weather, 
subway breakdowns etc) which will affect demand, but that this variation is transitory. 
Their main conclusion is that there is some possibility that New York cabdrivers, who 
are the subject of their paper, might make their decisions one day at a time, using a 
daily income target. Chou (2002) in another paper looking at taxi divers in Singapore 
arrives at very similar conclusions. CBLT do take pains to point out that their result 
should be treated with some caution. However target income behaviour, of course, 
generates predictions which are counter to the intertemporal labour supply hypothesis, 
as on high wage days the cabdrivers will hit the income target earlier and work fewer 
hours. 
 
                                                 
1 Tim Barmby, Centre for European Labour Market Research, Department of Economics, University of Aberdeen, Old 
Aberdeen, Scotland AB24 3QY tim.barmby@abdn.ac.uk 
 2
 This short note looks at some of the CBLT data again and suggests that certain 
conclusions of the original article may be modified, particularly with respect to the 
effect of level of experience of the cabdriver, as the title suggests. 
 
 
II. Data 
 
 The data2 used in this reanalysis is the sample of fleet drivers, (the TRIP sample 
in the original CBLT article). This is a small panel of  N=13 NYC cabdrivers who work 
between T=1 and T=11 days during the period 25th April -14th of May in the spring of 
1994, this makes NT= 70 cabbie-days in total.  Hours worked is computed by using 
information from the trip sheet on which the cab driver records the fares which were 
obtained during the day, the measure of hours is the difference between the time at 
which the first fare was recorded as being picked up and the recorded time of the last 
fare being dropped off. 
 
Hourly wage is computed by dividing total daily earnings by hours and so, as is 
well known, there is a potential for division bias, see Borjas (1980) and an Appendix of 
this paper, which will bias the wage effect downwards. The bias results from the 
possible existence of measurement error in hours, one possible source of this in the 
present context, considering how the observation on hours is obtained, is if some trips 
(and in particular the last, or first) are not entered on the trip sheet. CBLT are able to 
observe the number of trips independently of the trip sheet by a counting device o the 
meter. They use this information to screen out those drivers whose trip sheets record 
more than two trips less than that indicated on the meter. On average two trips would be 
a around a 7% error.  
 
 If the wage is correctly instrumented then this bias can be removed. Farber 
(2003) raises some questions as to whether the wage instrumentation in CBLT 
successfully achieves this. By constructing a more extensive specification for the wage 
instruments I show in this paper that the main conclusion of the CBLT paper loses 
some support. The wage instrumenting equation which CBLT use regresses the natural 
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log of wage on the 25th 50th and 75th percentile of the distribution of the other wages in 
the sample together with dummies for aspects of the weather and shift the cab driver 
was working. When this instumented wage is used in the labour supply equation the 
wage elasticity is not significantly different from zero. CBLT then split the sample by 
hack number to see whether the effect is different for “more experienced” drivers. Hack 
numbers are allocated sequentially as cab drivers obtain licenses, so higher numbers 
indicate less experience drivers CBLT split the sample at the median hack number. In 
CBLT’s table IV they find that the experienced subsample have a positive but 
insignificant coefficient. 
 
I find that this result is sensitive to the way in which the wage equation is 
specified if the CBLT specification is augmented by fixed effects for days and their 
variable for endtime (the time at which the last fare is dropped off), and offtrip (the 
number of fares recorded on the meter), more experienced drivers appear to have a 
significantly positive labour supply elasticity at least for the TRIP subsample. These 
labour supply results are reported in Table 1. The importance of fixed effects for days is 
essentially the conjecture of Farber3.  
 
 
      Table 1: Estimated IV Labour Supply Schedules with fixed effects for drivers 
 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
 CBLT wage instrument Augmented wage instrument 
Constant 2.3332 0.9006 1.1016    0.6124 
LnWage (IV) -1.0123 1.4665 -0.8230    0.4760 
LnWage*Exp (IV) 1.7607 2.4750 1.5754 0.7069 
High -0.0014 0.0025 -0.0014 0.0022 
Week -0.0266 0.0457 -0.0255 0.0400 
Rain -0.0287 0.0624 -0.0326 0.0442 
Shift 0.0384 0.0628 0.0325 0.0594 
F test (F, P value) 0.47, 0.4937 4.48, 0.0342 
R2 0.0017 0.0020 
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 The reported F test values are for the Null hypothesis that the sum of the 
coefficients on wage and the wage-experience interaction is equal to zero, that is the 
wage elasticity is zero for experienced drivers. As the results indicate we are unable to 
reject this using CBLT’s wage instrument equation, but are easily able to do this for the 
augmented instrumenting equation described in the text. This result put the general 
message of the earlier paper in a slightly different light. Entering the new instruments 
sequentially gives the following fall in the P value:- fixed effects for days, P = 0.0642, 
fixed effects for days and endtime, P=0.0552.  
 
Since there seemed to be clear variation in the size of the elasticity across 
drivers, I examined, using some simple non-parametric regressions the variation of the 
estimated elasticity over the range of values the instrumented log daily wage takes. This 
reveals the following patterns for the experienced and inexperienced sub samples. 
 
                       Figure 1a : Labour Supply Schedule for experienced drivers  
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As you would expect there is some visual confirmation of the positive effect of 
wage for experienced drivers in the plot reported in figure 1a. The estimated line seems 
approximately linear with a change in log hours of around 0.15 corresponding to a 
change in log wage of 0.5 (all logs are natural logs) implying an elasticity of around 
0.3. The pattern in the less experienced sample appears quite different as the next plot 
shows  
 
 
                    Figure 1b : Labour Supply Schedule for inexperienced drivers 
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In plot 1b for the inexperienced drivers there appears two distinct groups:- those 
above log hours of around 2.2 and those below, with some suggestion that the second 
group might well be contributing the bulk of the negative effect.  
 
It seems at least possible that these cab drivers observing that, say, the weather 
is bad on a particular day and that the demand for cab rides will be high, hire a cab later 
in the day in a speculative fashion. Why they then don’t follow through and work 
longer hours is however unclear, one explanation might be that they hold second jobs. 
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   Finally the labour supply schedule for the whole sample is reported for 
completeness, and the variation of the labour supply effect is clear 
 
                       Table 1c Labour supply schedule for all workers 
 
1.
8
2
2.
2
2.
4
lo
g 
ho
ur
s
2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4
instrumented lnwage
bandwidth = .8
Lowess smoother
 
 
IV Conclusion 
 
 This short note undertakes a reanalysis of the one of the samples of labour 
supply behaviour of New York cab drivers used by Camerer, et al (1997). Following a 
conjecture made by Farber(2003) it shows that the way in which the wage is 
instrumented does have some influence on the results obtained particularly with respect 
to the effect of experience. 
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Appendix: Division Bias 
 
“Divison Bias” arises in the following way  * * * * *ln ln
EH W u H Hv W
H
α β= + + = =  
an asterisk indicates that the variable is measured with multiplicative measurement error v. The 
estimation problem can be seen by considering the OLS estimation of β in the above and 
remembering what we want to recover is β%  in ln lnH Wα β e= + %% + the estimated slope in the 
equation without measurement error. 
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as the variability of the measurement error increases relative to the variability in the 
explanatory variable, wage, the estimated elasticity tends to -1. 
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